Registration Decision

Application name	Tanya Kum Sing & Ors on behalf of the Mitakoodi People #5 and State of Queensland & Ors (Mitakoodi People #5)	
Name of applicant	Tanya Kum Sing, Pearl Connelly, Kay Douglas, Norman Douglas, Ronald Major, Edward Ah Sam	
Federal Court of Australia No.	QUD556/2015	
NNTT No.	QC2015/009	
Date of Decision	21 February 2020	

Claim accepted for registration
I have decided the claim in the Mitakoodi People #5 second further amended application satisfies all the conditions in ss 190B–190C of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth). Therefore the claim must be accepted for registration and entered on the Register of Native Title Claims.

	
Katy Woods

Reasons for Decision
Cases Cited
Aplin on behalf of the Waanyi Peoples v State of Queensland [2010] FCA 625 (Aplin)
Corunna v Native Title Registrar [2013] FCA 372 (Corunna)
Fortescue Metals Group v Warrie on behalf of the Yindjibarndi People [2019] FCAFC 177 (Warrie)
Griffiths v Northern Territory of Australia [2007] FCAFC 178 (Griffiths FC) 
Gudjala People #2 v Native Title Registrar [2007] FCA 1167 (Gudjala 2007)
Gudjala People # 2 v Native Title Registrar (2008) 171 FCR 317; [2008] FCAFC 157 (Gudjala 2008)
Gudjala People #2 v Native Title Registrar [2009] FCA 1572 (Gudjala 2009)
Harrington-Smith on behalf of the Wongatha People v Western Australia (No 9) [2007] FCA 31 (Harrington-Smith)
Kanak v National Native Title Tribunal (1995) 61 FCR 103; [1995] FCA 1624 (Kanak)
Lawson on behalf of the `Pooncarie' Barkandji (Paakantyi) People v Minister for Land & Water Conservation for the State of New South Wales [2002] FCA 1517 (Lawson)
Martin v Native Title Registrar [2001] FCA 16 (Martin) 
Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2002) 214 CLR 422; [2002] HCA 58 (Yorta Yorta)
Noble v Mundraby [2005] FCAFC 212 (Noble)
Northern Territory of Australia v Doepel [2003] FCA 1384 (Doepel)
Sampi on behalf of the Bardi and Jawi People v State of Western Australia [2010] FCAFC 26 (Sampi FC)
Strickland v Native Title Registrar [1999] FCA 1530 (Strickland) 
Wakaman People 2 v Native Title Registrar and Authorised Delegate [2006] FCA 1198 (Wakaman)
Ward v Northern Territory [2002] FCA 171 (Ward v Northern Territory) 
Western Australia v Native Title Registrar (1999) 95 FCR 93; [1999] FCA 1591 (WA v NTR)
Western Australia v Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1; [2002] HCA 28 (Ward HC)
Wiri People v Native Title Registrar [2008] FCA 574 (Wiri People)

Background
[1]	The claim in this application is made on behalf of the Mitakoodi People native title claim group (claim group). The claim was first made on 8 July 2015. It was first accepted for registration and entered onto the Register of Native Title Claims (Register) on 25 September 2015. An amended application was filed on 24 September 2019. The claim was removed from the Register on 8 November 2019, after a delegate of the Native Title Registrar (Registrar) found that the amended application did not satisfy all of the conditions of ss 190B–190C (the registration test). 
[2]	After the claim was removed from the Register, the claim group filed a further amended application on 19 December 2019. A second further amended application was filed on 15 January 2020 and that same day the Registrar of the Federal Court (Court) gave a copy to the Registrar, pursuant to s 64(4).  The second further amended application is the version currently before me.
[3]	The granting of leave by the Court to amend the application was not made pursuant to s 87A, and so the circumstance described in s 190A(1A) does not arise. As the claim is not currently on the Register, the exception from the registration test prescribed in s 190A(6A) does not apply. Therefore, in accordance with s 190A(6), I must apply the full registration test and accept the claim for registration if it satisfies all the conditions in  ss 190B–190C.
Procedural fairness
[4]	On 20 January 2020, a senior officer of the National Native Title Tribunal (Tribunal) wrote to the relevant minister of the state of Queensland (State) advising that any submissions on the amended application’s ability to pass the registration test should be made by 31 January 2020.
[5]	Also on 20 January 2020, the senior officer wrote to the representative of the applicant and advised that any additional material which the applicant wished the delegate to consider should be provided by 31 January 2020.
[6]	No submissions were received from either the State or the applicant, and so this concluded the procedural fairness process.
Information considered
[7]	I have considered the information in the application and note that the applicant has not provided any additional information, as outlined above. 
[8]	I have considered information contained in the geospatial assessment and overlap analysis of the application area prepared by the Tribunal’s Geospatial Services dated 20 January 2020 (geospatial report) and information available in the Tribunal’s geospatial database in relation to locations mentioned in the application.
[9]	There is no information before me from searches of State or Commonwealth interest registers, and as noted above, the State has not supplied any information as to whether the registration test conditions are satisfied in relation to this claim. 
Section 190C: conditions about procedures and other matters
Information etc. required by ss 61–2 – s 190C(2): condition met
[10]	To meet s 190C(2), the Registrar must be satisfied the application contains all of the prescribed details and other information, and is accompanied by any affidavit or other document, required by ss 61–2. I am not required to undertake a merit assessment of the material at this condition. I have not addressed s 61(5) as I consider the matters covered by that condition are matters for the Court.
[11]	The application contains the details specified in s 61:
Section	Details 	Information	Result	
s 61(1)	Native title claim group have authorised the applicant	Part A, Schedule A, s 62 affidavits filed with application	Met	
s 61(3)	Name and address for service 	Part B	Met	
s 61(4)	Native title claim group named/described 	Schedule A	Met	
[12]	The application contains the information specified in s 62:
Section	Details 	Information	Result	
s 62(1)(a)	Affidavits in prescribed form	Section 62 affidavits filed with application 	Met	
s 62(2)(a)	Information about the boundaries of the area	Schedule B, 
Attachment B	Met	
s 62(2)(b)	Map of external boundaries of the area	Attachment C	Met	
s 62(2)(c)	Searches	Schedule D	Met	
s 62(2)(d)	Description of native title rights and interests	Schedule E	Met	
s 62(2)(e)	Description of factual basis 	Schedule F, Attachment ‘F and M’	Met	
s 62(2)(f)	Activities	Schedule G, 
Attachment ‘F and M’	Met	
s 62(2)(g)	Other applications	Schedule H	Met	
s 62(2)(ga)	Notices under s 24MD(6B)(c)	Schedule HA	Met	
s 62(2)(h)	Notices under s 29	Schedule I	Met	

No previous overlapping claim group – s 190C(3): condition met
[13]	To meet s 190C(3), the Registrar must be satisfied that no person included in the claim group for the current application was a member of a native title claim group for any previous application. To be a ‘previous application’:
(a)	the application must overlap the current application in whole or part;
(b)	there must be an entry for the claim in the previous application on the Register when the current application was made; and
(c)	the entry must have been made or not removed as a result of the previous application being considered for registration under s 190A.
[14]	The geospatial report states and my own searches confirm there are no applications which overlap the current application, as required by s 190C(3)(a). Therefore, there are no applications which meet the definition of a ‘previous application’ under s 190C(3). This means that the issue of common claimants does not arise and so s 190C(3) is met.
Identity of claimed native title holders – s 190C(4): condition met
[15]	To meet s 190C(4), the Registrar must be satisfied: 
(a)	the application has been certified under Part 11 by each representative Aboriginal/Torres Strait Islander body that could certify the application in performing its functions under that Part; or 
(b)	the applicant is a member of the native title claim group and is authorised to make the application, and deal with matters arising in relation to it, by all the other persons in the native title claim group.
[16]	Schedule R states that the applicant was authorised by the other persons in the claim group and refers to Attachment R. I therefore understand I must assess the application against the requirements of s 190C(4)(b).
What is required to meet s 190C(4)(b)?
[17]	Section 190C(4)(b) contains two limbs, both of which must be satisfied:
(a)	that the applicant is a member of the claim group; and
(b)	that the applicant is authorised to make the application, by all the other members of the claim group. 
[18]	Following s 190C(4)(b) there is a note in the Native Title Act referring to the definition of ‘authorising the making of applications’ in s 251B. That provision stipulates that all the persons in a claim group authorise a person to make an application and to deal with matters arising in relation to it, where one of the following processes of decision-making is utilised:
(a)	a process which, under the traditional laws and customs of the persons in the claim group, must be complied with; or 
(b)	where there is no traditional process, a process agreed to and adopted by the claim group.
[19]	The case law also confirms that s 190C(4)(b) requires consideration of whether the identified native title holders have authorised the applicant to make the application in accordance with s 251B.
[20]	Section 190C(5) states that if the application has not been certified under s 190C(4)(a), the Registrar cannot be satisfied that the condition in s 190C(4) is met unless the application:
(a)	includes a statement to the effect that the requirement in s 190C(4)(b) has been met; and
(b)	briefly sets out the grounds on which the Registrar should consider that the requirement in s 190C(4)(b) has been met.
[21]	I therefore understand that in order to be satisfied that s 190C(4)(b) is met, one of the decision- making processes outlined in s 251B must be identified and complied with, and the requirements of s 190C(5) must also be met.
Summary of the authorisation material
[22]	The information before me which is relevant to this condition is found in:
(a)	Schedule R; and
(b)	Attachment R, which contains:
1.	Affidavits of the members of the applicant (s 62 affidavits);
2.	Affidavit of the legal assistant of Just Us Lawyers, affirmed 19 July 2019  (meeting notice affidavit);
3.	Affidavit of the legal assistant of Just Us Lawyers, affirmed 23 July 2019 (meeting conduct affidavit); and
4.	Further affidavit of applicant member Tanya Kum Sing, affirmed 20 July 2019 (meeting attendance affidavit).
[23]	Annexed to the meeting conduct affidavit is a document titled ‘Mitakoodi Native Title Claim Group Authorisation Meeting 2019’.  A document with the same name appears in Attachment A to the application.  I have compared the two documents and am satisfied that their content is the same. In my reasons below I reference the page numbers for this document as they appear in the annexure to the meeting conduct affidavit.
Does the application satisfy s 190C(5)?
[24]	Schedule R states that the applicants are members of the claim group and are authorised to make the application and deal with matters arising in relation to it, by all other persons in the claim group. I consider this statement is sufficient to meet the requirements of s 190C(5)(a). 
[25]	Schedule R further states that the applicant was authorised at a meeting of the claim group held on 6 July 2019 (authorisation meeting).  The s 62 affidavits set out the process by which the applicant members were authorised by the claim group, using an agreed to and adopted process. 
[26]	Justice French commented that the insertion of the word ‘briefly’ in s 190C(5)(b) ‘suggests that the legislature was not concerned to require any detailed explanation of the process by which authorisation is obtained.’ In light of this guidance, I consider that the information contained in Schedule R and the s 62 affidavits is sufficient for the purposes of s 190C(5)(b). 
[27]	The application therefore satisfies s 190C(5).
Does the application satisfy s 190C(4)(b)?
[28]	Firstly, I must be satisfied the persons comprising the applicant are members of the claim group. As the s 62 affidavits all contain such a statement at paragraph 1, I am satisfied this requirement is met.
[29]	Secondly, I must be satisfied that the applicant is authorised to make the application, by all the other members of the claim group. The identification of the appropriate decision-making process and whether it was complied with is a primary consideration for my task at s 190C(4)(b). 
Which decision-making process under s 251B has been identified?
[30]	As noted above, Schedule R and the s 62 affidavits indicate that the claim group agreed to and adopted a process of decision-making to authorise the applicant.  
[31]	Annexed to the meeting conduct affidavit is a document summarising the outcomes of the authorisation meeting, which describes the adopted decision-making process as one requiring voting by a show of hands and resolution by majority.  
[32]	I therefore consider the application identifies the type of decision-making process described in s 251B(b).
How was the decision-making process applied in the decision to authorise the applicant?
[33]	In order to be satisfied that the necessary authorisation has been given by the claim group in accordance with the identified decision-making process, I must inquire through the material available to the Registrar. The material before me provides information about the notice and conduct of the authorisation meeting at which the applicant was authorised to make the application, which I have summarised below.
Notice of authorisation meeting
[34]	According to the meeting notice affidavit, notice of the authorisation meeting was given in the following ways:
(a)	Public notice in The Koori Mail on 21 June 2019 online and 3 July 2019 in print;
(b)	Public notice in the North West Star on 29 June 2019 in print;
(c)	Personal notice to 192 members of the claim group by mail; and
(d)	Personal notice to the members of the ‘Mitakoodi Cloncurry’ Facebook page on 21 June 2019.
[35]	Copies of each notice described above are annexed to the meeting notice affidavit.  I am satisfied each version contains the same information and so I will refer to them collectively as the notice.
[36]	The notice includes the date, time and venue for two meetings scheduled to be held on 6 July 2019 in Cloncurry. The purpose of the first meeting (Meeting #1) is to consider amending the claim group description to include additional apical ancestors.  The proposed amended claim group description is set out. The notice explains that if the proposed changes are authorised at Meeting #1, a second meeting will be held for the members of the amended claim group (Meeting #2). The purpose of Meeting #2 includes authorising the applicant members. The notice includes a contact number for registration.
Conduct of authorisation meeting
[37]	The meeting attendance affidavit states that 74 people attended Meeting #1. Annexed to the affidavit are the meeting registers, which show that 63 of those 74 people stayed for Meeting #2.
[38]	The meeting conduct affidavit provides the following information:
(a)	The attendees at Meeting #1 passed a resolution confirming there is no particular process of decision-making under their traditional laws and customs which must be used, and agreed to and adopted a decision-making process of majority vote of the persons present and entitled to vote at the meeting, by a show of hands. The claim group then used this process to make various decisions, including the amendment of the claim group description to include an additional apical ancestor.
(b)	The same decision-making process was adopted by the participants of Meeting #2, who passed a resolution confirming the amended claim group description which now appears in Schedule A. With regard to the authorisation of the applicant, the following information is recorded under ‘Resolution 3’:
1.	The Mitakoodi people are [described as per Schedule A to the application].
2.	That either Norman or [name removed] Douglas resign as an Applicant.
3.	Subject to clause 4 and without changing the existing terms of the appointment, the Applicants are authorised to continue to prosecute the Native Title Claim....
4.	Upon receipt of any resignation in accordance with paragraph 2 of this resolution, the remaining Applicants are authorised to continue prosecuting the Native Title Claim in its amended form.
5.	There should [be] no further changes to the Applicant and the meeting expresses the desire that all the Applicants work together to achieve a native title determination for the Mitakoodi people as soon as possible.
Consideration
[39]	I consider the notice of the meeting was sufficiently clear as to enable the details and purpose of the meeting to be understood. I also consider the notice of the meeting to be broad and comprehensive in its reach, using various media and a mix of personal and public notices in the weeks leading up to the authorisation meeting. I also consider the wording of the notice, which advises that authorisation meetings of the claim group will be held, combined with the map of the application area, gave the members of the claim group ‘reasonable opportunity’ to participate in the decision-making process to authorise the applicant. 
[40]	In my view, there is sufficient detail of the conduct of the authorisation meetings, including the relevant resolutions passed. The resolution to authorise the applicant was made using a process agreed to and adopted by the claim group which was used throughout both Meeting #1 and Meeting #2.
[41]	I note that this same material was considered by a delegate of the Registrar on 8 November 2019, and she was not satisfied that the members of the applicant were authorised by the claim group because both Mr Norman Douglas and Mr [name removed] Douglas were named as applicant members in Part A of the amended application before her. On the further amended application which is now before me, Mr [name removed] Douglas does not appear as a member of the applicant.  This indicates to me that the composition of the applicant now reflects the decision the claim group made in Resolution #3 of Meeting 2, and that the current members of the applicant are authorised by the claim group in accordance with that resolution.
[42]	I note O’Loughlin J’s theoretical questions about the meeting at which the applicant was authorised in the circumstances of the case of Ward v Northern Territory, the substance of which His Honour held must be addressed:
Who convened it and why was it convened? To whom was notice given and how was it given? What was the agenda for the meeting? Who attended the meeting? What was the authority of those who attended? Who chaired the meeting or otherwise controlled the proceedings of the meeting? By what right did that person have control of the meeting? Was there a list of attendees compiled, and if so by whom and when? Was the list verified by a second person? What resolutions were passed or decisions made? Were they unanimous, and if not, what was the voting for and against a particular resolution? Were there any apologies recorded? 
[43]	In my view, there is sufficient information to address the substance of those questions, such that I can be satisfied of the ‘fact of authorisation’. It follows that I am satisfied that the applicant is authorised to make the application, and deal with matters arising in relation to it, by all the other persons in the claim group.
Conclusion
[44]	As I consider the requirements of s 190C(5) and s 190C(4)(b) are met, including that the material addresses s 251B(b), I am satisfied s 190C(4) is met.
Section 190B: conditions about merits of the claim
Identification of area subject to native title – s 190B(2): condition met
[45]	To meet s 190B(2), the Registrar must be satisfied the information and map contained in the application are sufficient for it to be said with reasonable certainty whether native title rights and interests are claimed in relation to particular land or waters.
[46]	I understand the questions for this condition are whether the information and map provide certainty about: 
(a)	the external boundary of the area where native title rights and interests are claimed; and 
(b)	any areas within the external boundary over which no claim is made. 
Does the information about the external boundary meet this condition?
[47]	Schedule B refers to Attachment B, which describes the application area by metes and bounds referencing watercourses, the Cloncurry River sub-catchment area, land tenure boundaries, native title application and determination boundaries, and geographic coordinates to six decimal places referencing GDA94.
[48]	Schedule C refers to Attachment C, which contains a map prepared by the Tribunal’s Geospatial Services titled ‘Native Title Determination Application QUD556/2015 Mitakoodi & Mayi People #5 (QC2015/009)’.  The map is dated 5 September 2018 and includes:
(a)	The application area depicted with a bold blue outline;
(b)	Topographic basemap showing roads, watercourses and place names;
(c)	Scalebar, coordinate grid, locality diagram and map legend; and
(d)	Notes relating to the source, currency and datum of data used to prepare the map.
[49]	The assessment in the geospatial report is that the map and description are consistent and identify the application area with reasonable certainty. I have considered the map and description and I agree with that assessment.  I note the map title refers to the claim group as it was originally described, being ‘Mitakoodi & Mayi People #5’. In my view the use of the historical claim name does not diminish from the sufficiency of the map and description.
Does the information about excluded areas meet this condition?
[50]	Schedule B states that the application does not cover areas where previous exclusive possession acts were done, such as the granting of freehold leases, where previous non-exclusive possession acts have been done, or any other area where native title has been extinguished, except where any extinguishment is required to be disregarded by force of ss 47–47B.
[51]	I note French J’s comment with regard to general exclusion clauses of this nature, that ‘it is unrealistic to expect a concluded definition of the areas subject to these provisions to be given in the application. Their applicability to any area will require findings of fact and law to be made as part of the hearing of the application’. Following this reasoning, I am satisfied the areas affected by the general exclusion clauses in Schedule B can be ascertained at the appropriate time. 
[52]	Attachment B specifically excludes any lands or waters subject to or within the external boundaries of: 
(a)	QUD579/2005 Kalkadoon People #4 as determined by the Court on 12 December 2011;
(b)	QUD685/2012 Gkuthaarn and Kukatj People as accepted for registration on 25 March 2013; and
(c)	QUD592/2015 Koa People as accepted for registration in September 2015.
[53]	In my view, the specific exclusions are clear from the description in Attachment B.
Conclusion
[54]	As I consider that both the external boundary and the excluded areas of the application can be identified with reasonable certainty, I am satisfied that s 190B(2) is met.
Identification of the native title claim group – s 190B(3): condition met
[55]	To meet s 190B(3), the Registrar must be satisfied that the persons in the claim group are named in the application or are described sufficiently clearly so that it can be ascertained whether any particular person is in the claim group. 
[56]	I understand I am not required to do more than make ‘an assessment of the sufficiency of the description of the group for the purpose of facilitating the identification of any person as part of the group’ at this condition. 
[57]	Schedule A states:
The claim group on whose behalf this application is made is the Mitakoodi People.
The Mitakoodi people are aboriginal people who:
1.	Principally identify as Mitakoodi people and as belonging to the traditional country of their Mitakoodi forebears;
2.	Are recognised by other Mitakoodi people as the biological descendants of deceased Mitakoodi people; and
3.	Are the descendants of [five named apical ancestors].
[58]	It follows from this description that s 190B(3)(b) is applicable. I am therefore required to be satisfied that the persons in the claim group are described sufficiently clearly so that it can be ascertained whether any particular person is in that group. I note from the description that all three criteria must be met in order for a person to qualify for membership of the claim group.
Is the description sufficient to ascertain the members of the claim group?
Descent
[59]	I consider that requiring a person to show descent from an identified ancestor provides a clear starting point to commence an inquiry about whether a person is a member of the claim group and the criterion in paragraph 3 provides such a starting point. I will therefore consider this criterion first, despite its placement at the end of the description. 
[60]	The Court has previously held that describing a claim group with reference to descent from named ancestors satisfies the requirements of s 190B(3)(b). I consider that factual enquiries and genealogical research would lead to the identification of the people who meet the criterion in paragraph 3.
Recognition
[61]	Meeting the requirements of paragraph 2 requires ‘recognition’ by other Mitakoodi people.  Unlike paragraph 3, it is a subjective criterion.  Justice Dowsett observed in Aplin that ‘[a]s to substantive matters concerning membership, the claim group must act in accordance with traditional laws and customs’, and that membership ‘must be based on group acceptance’. I note also that in Sampi FC the Full Court agreed with the submission that ‘[a] relevant factor… in determining whether a group constitutes a society in the Yorta Yorta sense is the internal view of the members of the group – the emic view. The unity among members of the group required by Yorta Yorta means that they must identify as people together who are bound by the one set of laws and customs or normative system’. Attachment F and M to the application asserts that the Mitakoodi people hold rights in the application area pursuant to their traditional laws and customs. I therefore understand that it is with reference to those laws and customs that an individual would need to be ‘recognised’ by other Mitakoodi people as the biological descendants of deceased Mitakoodi people.
Identification
[62]	Like paragraph 2, the criterion in paragraph 1 is subjective. The Court has previously held that a person must identify themselves as a member of the particular claim group ‘either by assertion or by virtue of the way in which he or she conducts him or herself’.  I consider that determining whether a person meets this criterion could be ascertained by making enquiries with the individual in question to establish whether they principally identify as a Mitakoodi person belonging to the traditional country of their Mitakoodi forebears. 
Conclusion
[63]	I am satisfied the application describes the persons in the claim group sufficiently clearly such that it can be ascertained whether any particular person is a member of the group as required by s 190B(3)(b). This means s 190B(3) is met. 
Identification of claimed native title – s 190B(4): condition met
[64]	To meet s 190B(4), the Registrar must be satisfied the description contained in the application is sufficient to allow the claimed native title rights and interests to be identified. I have not considered whether the rights and interests claimed can be considered ‘native title rights and interests’ in accordance with s 223 as I consider that is part of the task at s 190B(6), where I must decide whether each of the claimed rights is established as a native title right on a prima facie basis. I note that my consideration of this condition is confined to information found in the application.
Does the description of native title rights and interests meet this condition?
[65]	From the description in the first paragraph of Schedule E, I understand that exclusive possession is claimed in any areas covered by the application where there has been no prior extinguishment or where ss 238, 47–47B apply. I understand that a broad claim to exclusive possession such as this one does not offend s 190B(4).
[66]	I understand that the non-exclusive rights listed in paragraph 2 of Schedule E are claimed in areas where exclusive possession cannot be recognised. The non-exclusive rights form an exhaustive list, and in my view there is no inherent or explicit contradiction within the description.
[67]	Paragraph 3 of Schedule E qualifies that the claimed rights and interests are subject to the laws of the State and the Commonwealth and the rights conferred under those laws.  
Conclusion
[68]	I am satisfied the description is sufficient to understand and identify all the claimed rights and interests, which means s 190B(4) is met.
Factual basis for claimed native title – s 190B(5): condition met
[69]	To meet s 190B(5), the Registrar must be satisfied there is sufficient factual basis to support the assertion that the claimed native title rights and interests exist. In particular, the factual basis must support the following assertions: 
(a)	that the native title claim group have, and the predecessors of those persons had, an association with the area; and
(b)	that there exist traditional laws acknowledged by, and traditional customs observed by, the native title claim group that give rise to the claim to native title rights and interests; and
(c)	that the native title claim group have continued to hold the native title in accordance with those traditional laws and customs. 
[70]	I understand my task is to assess whether the asserted facts can support the existence of the claimed native title rights and interests, rather than determine whether there is ‘evidence that proves directly or by inference the facts necessary to establish the claim’. 
What information has been provided in support of the assertions at s 190B(5)?
[71]	Schedule F, which requires applicants to outline the factual basis of their claim, refers to Attachment F and M, which is a document titled ‘Mitakoodi People’. Schedule M, which asks for the details of the traditional physical connection that claim group members have to the application area, also refers to this document. For convenience I will refer to this document as ‘Attachment F’ in my reasons below.  Schedule G lists the activities which the claim group carry out in relation to the application area.  I consider this is the extent of the information in the application which supports the assertions at s 190B(5). 
What is required to meet s 190B(5)(a)?
[72]	To meet s 190B(5)(a), the factual basis must be sufficient to show:
(a)	the claim group presently has an association with the application area, and the claim group’s predecessors have had an association with the application area since sovereignty or European settlement;
(b)	there is ‘an association between the whole group and the area’, although not ‘all members must have such association at all times’; and
(c)	there is an association with the entire area claimed, rather than an association with only part of it or ‘very broad statements’, which have no ‘geographical particularity’.
What information has been provided in support of the assertion at s 190B(5)(a)?
Association of the predecessors of the claim group with the application area
[73]	Attachment F provides:
(a)	European settlement occurred in the 1860s–1880s, following the expedition of Burke and Wills in 1860s, who recorded the presence of Aboriginal people in the application area around the upper Cloncurry River;
(b)	The locations established in the application area in the early decades of settlement include Canobie Station, Fort Constantine Station, Boomara Station, Wurung Station, Byrimine Station, Donors Hill Station and the town of Cloncurry;
(c)	In 1897 the Aboriginal people in the application area were described by Walter Roth as ‘Mitakoodi’;
(d)	Apical ancestor Minnie spent most if not all of her life in and around the application area: she gave birth to her daughter at Boomara Station in 1898, ‘tribally married’ at Canobie Station around 1931 and died at Fort Constantine Station in 1941. Minnie’s children also married, had children and spent their lives in and around the application area;
(e)	Apical ancestor Topsy lived all her life at Canobie Station. She gave birth to her daughters there around 1900, 1907, 1913, 1920 and 1925. Topsy was married at Canobie Station in 1912.  One of her daughters is recorded as being tribally married between 1929 and 1932, and all of her daughters went on to have children in the area;
(f)	Apical ancestor Thomas ‘Tiger’ Mitchell was born around 1878 at Talawanta Station, in the northern reaches of the application area. He had two sons and a daughter at Canobie Station in the 1890s with apical ancestor Dinah. One of their sons is recorded as tribally marrying a woman from the neighbouring Kalkadoon people.
(g)	Apical ancestor Dinah is estimated to have been born around 1873. She grew up on Canobie Station. Dinah had many children in the application area, including the three children with Tiger described above;
(h)	Apical ancestor Sophie is recorded as being from Wurung Station in the northern part of the application area.  She is estimated to have been born around 1862. She had several children in the application area, including a daughter born in the 1890s at Canobie Station. One of her sons married apical ancestor Topsy at Canobie Station in 1912, and another son married apical ancestor Minnie around 1930.  Sophie’s other children were also born in the application area and her descendants recall that she had a particular spiritual totemic relationship with the Cloncurry River;
(i)	Deceased predecessors are buried on country, in accordance with the claim group’s laws and customs.
Association of the current claim group with the claim area
[74]	With regard to the association of the current claim group, Attachment F provides the following information:
(a)	The daughter of apical ancestor Topsy, now a very senior member of the claim group, lived at Canobie Station and recalls trips with her family onto country to fish and collect traditional foods.
(b)	The daughter of apical ancestor Minnie is recalled as an ‘influential elder’ who lived with her children and grandchildren at the Aboriginal reserve at Coppermine Creek in the application area, living off the country through traditional means.
(c)	The daughter of apical ancestor Dinah is recalled as living near a branch of the Cloncurry River with her children, where they would fish and collect mussels.
(d)	One of Minnie’s grandsons is recorded as working as a stockman and woodcutter around Cloncurry as well as on the railways.  Other ancestors from the intervening generations also worked on the stations covering the application area.
(e)	Claimants recall hunting and living off bush tucker as children, including around Fort Constantine Station in the central part of the application area, and towards Malbon in the south. Today the claimants take their children and grandchildren out onto country to learn these skills.  
(f)	Several claimants reside in Cloncurry in the application area, and others in the nearby towns of Mt Isa and Normanton.
(g)	Claimants recall swimming in the Gilliat Channels, in the east of the application area, with their predecessors.
(h)	Claimants believe that the spirits of the old people reside in their country after they have died.
Is the factual basis sufficient to support the assertion at s 190B(5)(a)?
[75]	I understand that in assessing the factual basis for the purposes of s 190B(5)(a), I am not obliged to accept very broad statements which have no geographical particularity. I do not consider this application is of that nature. In my view, the information before me addresses the relationship the claim group claims to have with the relevant land and waters, in a sufficient level of detail, both at the time of settlement and since that time. I have considered whether there is information sufficient to support the requirements of s 190B(5)(a) below. 
Is the factual basis sufficient to support an association between the claim group at sovereignty and since that time with the area?
[76]	Attachment F describes a number of locations which lie in and around the application area. I have identified these locations in the Tribunal’s geospatial database to enable me to be satisfied that the factual basis is sufficient to support an assertion of an association of the ancestors of the claim group with the application area. I note the references to the pastoral stations which cover the application area, in particular Canobie Station, where many of the apical ancestors were born, worked, had children and married.
[77]	Settlement in the application area is asserted to have occurred in the 1860s–1880s, much later than the acquisition of British sovereignty in 1788.  The apical ancestors are all estimated to have been born in the very early years of settlement, the earliest being Sophie in 1862. In my view, the apical ancestors would have had a similar association with the application area as their forebears who were alive at the time of sovereignty. In making this retrospective inference I have considered the judicial guidance of Lindgren J on making such inferences in Harrington-Smith, and of French J in Kanak on construing the Native Title Act beneficially.
Is the factual basis sufficient to support an association between the claim group and the area currently?
[78]	In my view, the factual basis is sufficient to support the assertion that the claim group currently has an association with the application area. In forming this view I have considered the information about the physical and spiritual connection to the application area which current claim group members describe.  I note that a daughter of apical ancestor Topsy is today a senior member of the claim group who demonstrates a similar association to the application area as that of her mother. She and other claim group members describe spending time on the application area and participating in activities such as hunting, fishing and collecting traditional foods, as well as working on the pastoral stations.  Claimants describe taking their children and grandchildren onto country in order to pass on traditional skills. The claimants also assert a spiritual association through the belief that the spirits of deceased claim group members continue to reside on country.
Is the factual basis sufficient to support an association, both past and present, with the whole area claimed?
[79]	I understand the task of the Registrar at s 190B(5)(a) is limited to assessing whether the factual basis is sufficient to support the assertion that the claim group have, and their predecessors had, an association over the application area as a whole. It is not a requirement that the every member of the claim group have an association with the entire application area at all times.
[80]	In my view, there is sufficient information in the application to support an association by the claim group, past and present, with the application area as a whole. I note the references, both historical and recent, to the pastoral stations which overlay the application area, as well as to the town of Cloncurry and surrounds. Claimants describe their association with the Cloncurry River and the Gilliat Channels, both of which flow from north to south, passing through the western and eastern parts of the application area respectively.
Conclusion - s 190B(5)(a)
[81]	In my view, the information before me is sufficient to support the assertion that the claim group have, and its predecessors had, an association with the application area. This is because the material demonstrates sufficient geographical particularity to locations where claim group members and their predecessors were born, lived, had children, married, worked and were buried. I am satisfied there is sufficient factual basis to support an assertion of a physical association of the claim group to the whole application area. I am also satisfied there is a sufficient factual basis to support an assertion of a spiritual association. This means s 190B(5)(a) is met.
What is required to meet s 190B(5)(b)?
[82]	To meet s 190B(5)(b), the factual basis must be sufficient to support an assertion that there exist traditional laws acknowledged and traditional customs observed by the claim group that give rise to the claim to native title rights and interests. ‘Native title rights and interests’ is defined in s 223(1)(a) as those rights and interests ‘possessed under the traditional laws acknowledged, and traditional customs observed,’ by the native title holders. 
[83]	In Yorta Yorta the plurality of the High Court held that a ‘traditional’ law or custom is one which has been passed from generation to generation of a society, usually by word of mouth and common practice. The High Court further held that in the context of the Native Title Act, ‘traditional’ also carries two other elements, namely:
[I]t conveys an understanding of the age of the traditions: the origins of the content of the law or custom concerned are to be found in the normative rules of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander societies that existed before the assertion of sovereignty by the British Crown. It is only those normative rules that are "traditional" laws and customs;
[T]he normative system under which the rights and interests are possessed (the traditional laws and customs) is a system that has had a continuous existence and vitality since sovereignty. If that normative system has not existed throughout that period, the rights and interests which owe their existence to that system will have ceased to exist.
[84]	In Warrie, the Full Court held that:
Where a rule, or practice or behaviour in relation to the identified land and waters arises from traditional law, and has normative content, then it can be capable of satisfying para (a) of s 223(1);
[A] claim group must establish that the traditional law and custom which gives rise to their rights and interests in that land and waters stems from rules that have a normative character, there is no further gloss or overarching requirement, and no further rigidity. The Native Title Act in terms does not require establishment of some overarching “society” that can only be described in one way and with which members of a claim group are forever fixed in relation to any other land and waters over which they assert native title.
[85]	In Gudjala 2009, Dowsett J held that if descent from named ancestors is the basis of membership of the group, the factual basis must demonstrate some relationship between those ancestors and the pre-sovereignty society from which the laws and customs of the claim group are derived.
[86]	I therefore understand my assessment of the sufficiency of the factual basis under s 190B(5)(b) requires the identification of:
(a)	a link between the pre-sovereignty society, the apical ancestors and the claim group in the application area; and
(b)	the continued observance of normative rules by the successive generations of the claim group, such that the normative rules can be described as ‘traditional laws and customs’.
What information has been provided in support of the assertion at s 190B(5)(b)
[87]	Attachment F provides:
(a)	Relationship between Mitakoodi identity and rights and interests in land:
1.	Mitakoodi people acquire rights to and responsibility for the land and waters of the application area from their predecessors back to the apical ancestors through a classificatory kinship system;
2.	Through the kinship system, rights and interests are acquired in particular parts of the application area, based on the apical ancestors’ association with those parts. For example, apical ancestor Tiger Mitchell’s traditional lands are found in the northwest of the application area, and Sophie is associated with the Cloncurry River;
(b)	Trade and ceremony:
1.	At settlement, the Mitakoodi people participated in a regional economy where groups would meet for trade and ceremony at places located in the application area now covered by the Canobie and Fort Constantine pastoral stations, and also near the eastern boundary of the application area at Mullangera;
2.	The trade and ceremonial locations are known to current claimants, who recall their predecessors making items for such ceremonies and trading materials collected in the application area, including wood and ochre.
(c)	Spiritual beliefs and practices connected to country:
1.	The claim group’s belief in an all-powerful spirituality of the landscape is managed through normative rules which prescribe behaviour in relation to the land, including avoidance of particular places, rules for taking and using plants and animals, prohibition on the removal of certain objects, and protocols for speaking to the spirits which inhabit the landscape;
2.	The claim group’s spiritual beliefs also manifest in the rules relating to burial practices, with deceased people ‘brought home’ to be buried on their own country and in some cases at particular locations, such as burial trees;
3.	The claimants believe that the spirits of the old people reside within the country, they know the locations of the burial sites and visit them regularly;
4.	Current claimants were taught stories of the totemic beings and spirits associated with the application area by their predecessors;
(d)	Traditional practices:
1.	The daughter of apical ancestor Topsy describes learning traditional skills from her mother and from apical ancestor Minnie, including how to gather certain foods and fish;
2.	Another current claimant recalls learning ‘everything’ from the daughter of Minnie, including the rules of how to cook and prepare food;
3.	Claimants take their children and grandchildren onto the application area to learn these traditional skills and the associated rules, as taught to them by their predecessors, including respecting the resident spirits.
Is the factual basis sufficient to support the assertion of s 190B(5)(b)?
Does the factual basis address the link between the pre-sovereignty society, the apical ancestors and the claim group?
[88]	There is considerable information in Attachment F about the apical ancestors, including the locations of their birth, their traditional marriages and their affiliations to particular parts of the application area. Attachment F describes the laws and customs of the society into which the apical ancestors were born. In my view it is reasonable to infer that those same laws and customs existed prior to sovereignty and were taught to the apical ancestors by their predecessors in much the same way as they in turn taught them to the subsequent generations. I therefore consider there is a link between the apical ancestors and the society of people who lived in and around the application area prior to European settlement.  In addition, Attachment F describes the current claim group as the people who have inherited rights to the application area, and have been taught the laws and customs by their predecessors. In my view this information sufficiently demonstrates a link between the claim group, the apical ancestors and the society which existed in the application area prior to British sovereignty.
Is the factual basis sufficient to support the assertion of the existence of ‘traditional laws and customs’?
[89]	I consider the material before me demonstrates how the laws and customs have been observed by successive generations of the claim group in the application area. Settlement of the application area occurred relatively recently and the current claim group includes the grandchildren of the apical ancestors, as well as the daughter of Topsy. These claimants describe how they were taught the laws and customs from their predecessors, including how rights to land are acquired, the classificatory kinship system, and the rules of normative conduct in relation to land, based on the group’s spiritual beliefs. 
[90]	In my view, there is also sufficient information to show the laws and customs of the claim group are ‘traditional’ in the Yorta Yorta sense. This is because there are examples provided about the predecessors of the claim group, including some of the apical ancestors, handing down the laws and customs to members of the current claim group, and those claimants passing them on to their children and grandchildren. The belief in the spiritual imbuement of the landscape, the burial rules and the prohibition on entering particular sites are salient examples. There are also many examples provided of claimants learning from their predecessors the methods of hunting, fishing and preparing food in particular ways, and taking their children onto the application area and teaching them these practices.
[91]	I consider it is reasonable to infer that the predecessors of the current claim group acquired their knowledge of the laws and customs in much the same way as they passed it on to their descendants, through teaching, oral transmission and common practice, thus supporting the assertion that the laws and customs are ‘traditional’.
Conclusion – s 190B(5)(b)
[92]	I am satisfied there is a link between the pre-sovereignty society in the application area, the apical ancestors and the current members of the claim group. I am also satisfied the factual basis is sufficient to support the assertion that there exist traditional laws acknowledged and traditional customs observed by the claim group. This means s 190B(5)(b) is met. 
What is required to meet s 190B(5)(c)?
[93]	Meeting the requirements of this condition relies on whether there is a sufficient factual basis to support the assertion at s 190B(5)(b), that there exist traditional laws and customs which give rise to the claimed native title rights and interests. It also requires a sufficient factual basis to support an assertion that there has been continuity in the observance of traditional laws and customs going back to sovereignty or at least to European settlement.
Is the factual basis sufficient to support the assertion of the continuity of traditional laws and customs?
[94]	As summarised above in relation to ss 190B(5)(a)–(b), the factual basis demonstrates an ongoing association with the application area, identifies a link between the pre-sovereignty society in the application area, the apical ancestors and the claim group, and supports the existence of traditional laws and customs. 
[95]	I note that the current claim group includes one of the children of the apical ancestors, and many of the apical ancestors’ grandchildren. In my view, an inference of continuity can more easily be made when only a few generations separate the current claim group from those who were alive at the time of settlement. 
[96]	Attachment F provides examples of how the laws and customs have been passed down to current members of the claim group by their predecessors through oral transmission and common practice. The continuing observance of the kinship system, rules relating to access to country (such as avoidance rules), burial practices, and the particular preparation of animals for food are examples which I consider are relevant to s 190B(5)(c). The knowledge that claimants hold about protocols for entering particular sites and the mythological stories about such sites, both of which they have learned from their predecessors, also supports the continued observance of the traditional laws and customs. 
[97]	In my view, there are sufficient examples in the information before me of how laws and customs have been observed by the claim group, substantially uninterrupted, since at least settlement in the application area. 
Conclusion – s 190B(5)(c)
[98]	I am satisfied the factual basis is sufficient to support the assertion that the claim group have continued to hold their native title rights in accordance with traditional laws and customs since at least the time of European settlement in the application area. The additional material demonstrates that claimants possess knowledge about how the previous generations acknowledged and observed their laws and customs in relation to the application area. I consider the factual basis sufficient to support an assertion of continuity in the observance of traditional laws and customs, which means s 190B(5)(c) is met. 
Conclusion
[99]	As I consider the factual basis on which it is asserted that the claimed native title rights and interests exist is sufficient to support the three assertions of ss 190B(5)(a)–(c), I am satisfied s 190B(5) is met.
Prima facie case – s 190B(6): condition met
[100]	To meet s 190B(6), the Registrar must consider that, prima facie, at least some of the native title rights and interests claimed can be established. According to s 223(1), a ‘native title right or interest’ is one that is held under traditional laws acknowledged and traditional customs observed by the native title claim group.
[101]	I note the following judicial guidance about s 190B(6):
(a)	it requires some measure of the material available in support of the claim;
(b)	it appears to impose a more onerous test to be applied to the individual rights and interests claimed; and
(c)	the words ‘prima facie’ mean ‘if on its face a claim is arguable, whether involving disputed questions of fact or disputed questions of law, it should be accepted on a prima facie basis’.
[102]	It is not my role to resolve whether the asserted factual basis will be made out at trial. My task is to consider whether there is any probative factual material which supports the existence of each individual right and interest, noting that as long as some rights can be prima facie established, the requirements of s 190B(6) will be met. Only those rights and interests I consider can be established prima facie will be entered on the Register. 
Which of the claimed native title rights and interests are established on a prima facie basis?
Over areas where a claim to exclusive possession can be recognized (such as areas where there has been no prior extinguishment of native title or where s238, ss47, 47A or 47B apply), the Mitakoodi People claim the right to possess, occupy, use and enjoy the lands and waters of the application area as against the whole world, pursuant to the traditional laws and customs of the claim group. 
[103]	I note the majority’s comment in Ward HC that ‘[t]he expression “possession, occupation, use and enjoyment … to the exclusion of all others” is a composite expression directed to describing a particular measure of control over access to land’. 
[104]	I also note the Full Court’s observations in Griffiths FC that:
[i]f control of access to country flows from spiritual necessity because of the harm that “the country” will inflict upon unauthorised entry, that control can nevertheless support a characterisation of the native title rights and interests as exclusive. The relationship to country is essentially a “spiritual affair”. It is also important to bear in mind that traditional law and custom, so far as it bore upon relationships with persons outside the relevant community at the time of sovereignty, would have been framed by reference to relations with indigenous people. The question of exclusivity depends upon the ability of the [native title holders] effectively to exclude from their country people not of their community. If, according to their traditional law and custom, spiritual sanctions are visited upon unauthorised entry and if they are the gatekeepers for the purpose of preventing such harm and avoiding injury to the country, then they have … an exclusive right of possession, use and occupation.
[105]	The Full Court also stated in Griffiths FC that demonstrating the existence of exclusive rights depends on the consideration of what the evidence discloses about the right’s content under traditional laws and customs. I therefore understand that I must consider whether the material demonstrates that the traditional laws and customs of the claim group permit them to exercise control over others’ access to the land and waters of the application area.
[106]	According to Attachment F, the pastoralist of Canobie Station recorded in the late 19th century, that ‘[w]hen tribes met at certain places such as large lagoons in another’s hunting-ground, they did so with the permission or consent of the owner of that place’. Roth describes the rules of access to the trade centres in the application area, (described at s 190B(5)(b) above), including that visitors to these ‘swapping grounds’ would carry message sticks as a form of passport, and were required to walk along designated paths while in the host’s country.
[107]	A current claimant stresses the spiritual consequences which can flow from improper access to country, citing examples of people falling sick and passing away as a result of accessing places improperly.
[108]	As discussed above at s 190B(5)(b), Attachment F explains that rights and interests in the application area are exercised ‘within the context of an all powerful and at times dangerous spirituality’, which requires adherence to rules which mandate behaviour, including avoidance of places and ‘when to acknowledge and speak to spirits of the country so that they can be mollified or placated’.  From the information before me, I understand that the members of the claim group hold the relevant knowledge and can speak to the spirits of their country, and in this way they are able to exercise control over others’ access to the application area. I therefore consider the claimants are the ‘gatekeepers for the purpose of preventing harm’, as described in Griffiths FC and that the content of the traditional laws and customs shows how a right of exclusive possession operates in relation to the application area.
[109]	I therefore consider this right is prima facie established.
Over the areas where a claim to exclusive possession cannot be recognised, the Mitakoodi People claim the following non-exclusive right to: 
a)	access, be present on, move about on and travel over the application area;
[110]	Attachment F provides numerous examples of claimants, past and present, accessing the application area for various purposes, including to work, hunt, fish and gather resources for food and medicine. Attachment F explains that the claim group consider their rights to the application area are held pursuant to their traditional laws and customs, as the descendants of the apical ancestors.
[111]	I consider this right is prima facie established.
b)	camp, and live temporarily on the application area as part of camping, and for that purpose build temporary shelters;
[112]	Attachment F references historical sources which describe the predecessors of the claim group camping in temporary shelters in particular areas during different seasons, and the construction of a particular type of hut in the Cloncurry district.  Current claimants recall camping in such shelters and describe how they continue to camp in particular areas.
[113]	I consider this right is prima facie established.
c)	hunt, fish and gather on the land and waters of the application area for personal, domestic, commercial and communal purposes;
[114]	Attachment F also references historical sources which describe the primary food types sought by the predecessors of the claim group, including birds, emus and fish.  Particular fishing techniques practiced by Mitakoodi people around the Cloncurry district were recorded in detail. Senior claimants, including the grandchildren of the apical ancestors, recall learning such techniques from their predecessors, and explain that they have taught these hunting, fishing and gathering skills, and the associated rules, to their descendants on the application area.
[115]	I consider this right is prima facie established.
d)	take, use, share and exchange natural resources from the land and waters of the application area for personal, domestic, commercial and communal purposes;
[116]	As discussed above at s 190B(5)(b), at the time of settlement the Mitakoodi people participated in a regional economy through which various goods and resources were traded. Attachment F describes how resources such as wood and ochre were taken from the application area and traded at the centres in the application area.  Throughout the 20th century, claimants continued to collect the natural resources of the application area and claimants today describe the collection of honey in accordance with traditional methods.
[117]	I consider this right is prima facie established.
e)	take and use the water of the application area for personal, domestic, commercial and communal purposes;
[118]	In Attachment F a claimant recalls digging soaks with her brothers to collect drinking water, and the material asserts that before settlement and during the 20th century, claim group members lived near rivers and waterholes so they could readily use the water for drinking and swimming, as well as in the production of traditional medicines, which claimants continue to make today.
[119]	I consider this right is prima facie established.
f)	conduct ceremonies and dance on the application area;
[120]	As noted at s 190B(5)(b) above, the material describes ceremonies which occurred at locations across the application area in the early decades of settlement. In Attachment F a claimant recalls corroborees at Canobie Station in the 1930s. Today, claimants know the location of ceremonial bora grounds and ‘men’s business areas’, which are to be avoided under the group’s traditional laws and customs.  
[121]	I consider this right is prima facie established.
g)	hold meetings on the application area;
[122]	Attachment F summarises a historical account of a men’s council held on Canobie Station in the late 19th century, including the matters discussed, protocols for participation and punishments administered. Attachment F also describes gathering of people on the application area in recent times for various reasons including cultural heritage clearances and cultural lessons.
[123]	I consider this right is prima facie established.
h)	teach on the area the physical and spiritual aspects of the application area;
[124]	As discussed above at s 190B(5)(b), current claim group members describe how they teach their children and grandchildren the traditional laws and customs pertaining to the application area. Claimants also describe their parents and other predecessors teaching them those same laws and customs, which I consider demonstrates that this right has been exercised in relation to the application area by the claim group since settlement.  Claimants also describe taking school children on excursions to the application area to teach them how to fish and find bush tucker.
[125]	I consider this right is prima facie established.
i)	light fires on the application area;
[126]	Some senior claimants recall their father hunting animals and collecting mussels and fish, which he would then cook on hot coals.  Another claimant describes how she was taught the traditional method of cooking by her predecessors, which she still uses today to cook kangaroo.
[127]	I consider this right is prima facie established.
j)	maintain places of importance and areas of significance to the native title holders under their traditional laws and customs, and protect those places and areas from physical harm;
[128]	As discussed above in relation to s 190B(5)(b) and in relation to the claimed right to exclusive possession, the claim group engage with their country in accordance with rules which acknowledge the spirits who are believed to reside within the landscape. Attachment F describes how this belief obliges claimants to protect places of significance, such as burial sites and painting sites.  Today, this protection is carried out through participation in cultural heritage surveys and clearances.
[129]	I consider this right is prima facie established.
k)	be accompanied onto the application area by certain non-native title holders, being:
a.	immediate family of native title holders, pursuant to the exercise of traditional laws acknowledged and customs observed by the native title holders; and
b. 	people required under the traditional laws acknowledged and traditional customs observed by the native title holders for the performance of, or participation in, ceremonies and dance.
[130]	As discussed above in relation to the claimed right of exclusive possession, historical sources describe the protocols for seeking permission to access the application area in the early decades of settlement. Attachment F also notes the marriages of apical ancestors and other predecessors to non-Mitakoodi people from neighbouring areas. Claimants stress the importance of accompanying people onto the application area so that harm can be avoided. In my view, these examples point to the observance of a normative rule of accompanying non-native title holders onto the application area which was observed in the early years of settlement as well as currently.
[131]	I consider this right is prima facie established.
Conclusion
[132]	I am satisfied the application contains sufficient information about all of the rights claimed, such that they can be said to be established on a prima facie basis pursuant to traditional laws and customs of the claim group. I am also satisfied those rights can be considered ‘native title rights and interests’. This is because there is information in the application to show how those rights were observed in the early years of settlement as well as in recent times. Additionally, according to the definition in s 223(1), a native title right or interest is one held under traditional laws and customs, and I am satisfied there is sufficient factual basis to support the assertion of the existence of traditional laws and customs, as discussed above at s 190B(5)(b). This means s 190B(6) is met.
Traditional physical connection – s 190B(7): condition met
[133]	To meet s 190B(7), the Registrar must be satisfied at least one member of the claim group:
(a)	currently has or previously had a traditional physical connection with any part of the land or waters covered by the application; or
(b)	previously had and would reasonably have been expected currently to have such a connection but for things done by the Crown, a statutory authority of the Crown or any holder of or person acting on behalf of the holder of a lease, other than the creation of an interest in relation to land or waters.
[134]	I note this condition requires the material to satisfy the Registrar of particular facts such that evidentiary material is required, and that the physical connection must be in accordance with the traditional laws and customs of the claim group. 
Is there evidence that at least one member of the claim group has or had a traditional physical connection?
[135]	Based on the information before me, I consider at least one claim group member currently has or had a traditional physical connection to the land and waters covered by the application. As summarised above at s 190B(5) and s 190B(6), there is information in the application which describes current claimants living and camping on the application area, accessing and using its natural resources for food and medicine.
[136]	I also consider the claimants’ connection with the application area is ‘traditional’ in the sense required by s 190B(7). As I am satisfied the factual basis is sufficient to support an assertion that the laws and customs have been passed down to the current members of the claim group by their predecessors, it follows that I am satisfied their connection with the application area is in accordance with those traditional laws and customs.
Conclusion
[137]	I am therefore satisfied at least one member of the native title claim group currently has or had a traditional physical connection with a part of the claim area as required by s 190B(7)(a), and so s 190B(7) is met.
No failure to comply with s 61A – s 190B(8): condition met
[138]	In my view the application complies with the provisions of ss 61A(1)–(3) and therefore satisfies the condition of s 190B(8):
Section	Requirement	Information 	Result	
s 61A(1)	No native title determination application if approved determination of native title	The geospatial report states and my own searches confirm that the application does not cover an area where there has been an approved determination of native title.	Met	
s 61A(2)	Claimant application not to be made covering previous exclusive possession act areas	Schedule B, paragraph 1 states that the application does not cover any area covered by previous exclusive possession acts, such as Scheduled Interests and freehold estates.	Met 	
s 61A(3)	Claimant application not to claim possession to the exclusion of all others in previous non-exclusive possession act areas	Schedule B paragraph 3 states that exclusive possession is not claimed over areas that are subject to valid previous non-exclusive possession acts.	Met 	
No extinguishment etc. of claimed native title – s 190B(9): condition met
[139]	In my view the application meets the requirements of s 190B(9):
Section	Requirement	Information 	Result	
s 190B(9)(a)	No claim made of ownership of minerals, petroleum or gas that are wholly owned by the Crown	Schedule Q states that the applicant does not claim any minerals, petroleum or gas wholly owned by the Crown. 	Met	
s 190B(9)(b)	Exclusive possession is not claimed over all or part of waters in an offshore place	Schedule P states that no claim of exclusive possession is made in relation to any offshore place. 	Met	
s 190B(9)(c)	Native title rights and/or interests in the claim area have otherwise been extinguished	Schedule B paragraph 6 states that the application excludes land or waters where native title rights and interests have been extinguished. 	Met	

End of reasons